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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to raise certain questions within the Malaysian banking sector and find the appropriate 
answers. The research questions of this paper are: a) whether Islamic banks are more stable relative to conventional 
banks; and b) what are the determinants of stability for both types of banks? In measuring and comparing the stability 
of Islamic and conventional banks, this study employs the financial soundness indicators (FSI) of the International 
Monetary Funds (IMF) and the z-score index. These are then followed by a series of parametric and non-parametric tests. 
Thereafter, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) robust regression is applied to examine the determinants of stability 
for Islamic and conventional banks. The results reveal that Islamic banks are significantly less stable than conventional 
banks. However, when the analysis is conducted based on a sample of small and large banks, the results suggest that 
only large Islamic banks are less stable than large conventional banks. In contrast, small Islamic banks are found to 
be more stable than small conventional banks. Furthermore, the results reveal that bank size, the level of capitalisation 
and income diversification are important determinants for the stability of Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks.
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ABSTRAK
Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk membangkitkan soalan-soalan tertentu dalam sektor perbankan di Malaysia dan 
mencari jawapan yang sesuai untuknya. Persoalan kajian yang akan dijawab ialah: a) sama ada bank-bank Islam 
lebih stabil berbanding bank-bank konvensional dan b) apakah faktor-faktor penentu kestabilan bagi kedua-dua jenis 
bank ini? Dalam mengukur dan membandingkan kestabilan bank-bank Islam dan bank-bank konvensional, kajian 
ini menggunakan indikator keteguhan kewangan daripada International Monetary Fund (IMF) dan indeks z-score, 
kemudian, diikuti dengan siri ujian parametrik dan bukan parametrik. Selepas itu, kaedah regrasi kuasa dua terkecil 
secara pooled (OLS) yang tekal digunakan untuk mengenal pasti faktor-faktor penentu kestabilan bagi bank-bank Islam 
dan bank-bank konvensional. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa bank-bank Islam adalah kurang stabil berbanding 
bank-bank konvensional. Walau bagaimanapun, apabila analisis dijalankan berdasarkan sampel daripada bank-bank 
yang bersaiz kecil dan besar, keputusan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa bank-bank Islam yang bersaiz besar sahaja 
yang kurang stabil berbanding bank-bank konvensional yang besar. Sebaliknya, bank-bank Islam bersaiz kecil didapati 
lebih stabil daripada bank-bank konvensional bersaiz kecil. Tambahan pula, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa saiz bank, 
tahap pemodalan dan kepelbagaian pendapatan adalah faktor-faktor penentu yang penting bagi kestabilan bank-bank 
Islam dan bank-bank konvensional di Malaysia. 
Kata kunci: Bank; krisis; kestabilan kewangan
INTRODUCTION
The recent 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis had 
exhibited the failure of major conventional banks in 
the West. There are several causes to the global crisis, 
among others are risk transfers and imprudent credit 
growth, failure of risk management, lax of regulation 
and supervision, and low level of transparency and 
disclosure (Aziz 2008; Bernanke 2009; Mirakhor 
2009). In response to the crisis, the European Union’s 
(EU’s) competition commissioner stressed on the need 
to replace unsustainable and overleveraged banking 
structures with simpler, less leveraged, more prudent 
and more transparent form of banking (Newman 2009). 
Interestingly, these characteristics are actually embedded 
within the Islamic financial system.
In addition, the recent global financial crisis has led to 
an increase of global interest in using the Islamic banking 
system as an alternative to the conventional banking 
system. This is why, nowadays, the Islamic banking 
system has not only flourished in the Muslims populated 
region of the world, but also welcomed in the non-Muslim 
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region. Britain for example, has pledged to rival Dubai 
and Malaysia as the centre of Shariah-compliant finance 
(Wilson 2013). In showing its commitment, in June 2014, 
Britain has become the first country outside the Muslims 
populated world to issue sovereign sukuk (Islamic bond) 
(HM Treasury 2014). 
As the Islamic banking system has managed to attract 
interest around the globe and continuously gaining market 
share, the system is expected to have important roles 
towards the stability of banking system. Perhaps, the 
increase in global attention towards Islamic banks could 
be due to the literature, which reveals the superiority 
in performance of Islamic banks over its conventional 
counterparts. The superiority in performance of Islamic 
banks have contributed to the financial and economic 
stability of these institutions (Hasan & Dridi 2010; 
Parashar & Venkatesh 2010).
Despite the increased attention towards Islamic 
banks, Usmani (2010) and Chapra (2009) argued that 
Islamic banks are operating in a conventional-dominant 
financial system, and thus are forced to participate in 
the existing market risks. Hence, this might affect the 
stability of Islamic banks. This is further supported by 
newer studies that produced inconclusive results on the 
issue of stability of Islamic banks over the conventional 
counterparts (Rokhim & Gamaginta 2009; Kassim & 
Abd. Majid 2010; Belouafi, Bourakba and Saci 2013; 
Bourkhis & Nabi 2013).
Studies that examine the stability of Islamic banks 
over conventional banks are relatively scarce. The current 
literature (e.g., Čihák & Hesse 2010; Pappas, Ongena, 
Izzeldin and Fuertes 2016; Bourkhis & Nabi 2013) have 
considered cross-country sample with evidence obtained 
being general and does not necessary apply at country 
level. Hence, no clear conclusion can be made for Islamic 
banks in Malaysia. Analysing the stability of Malaysian 
Islamic banks is important as Malaysia is one of the 
pioneers in Islamic banking industry and is one of the 
centres of focus of global attention towards the Islamic 
banking business.
A number of literature focusing on the state of 
stability of Malaysian Islamic banks can be found (e.g., 
Kassim & Abd. Majid 2010; Mat Rahim & Zakaria 
2013; Abdul Rahman & Masngut 2014; Verbeet 2014). 
Nonetheless, those studies covered a limited time period. 
In spite of these early studies, the recent status of stability 
of Islamic banks over the conventional banks post 2007 
to 2009 global financial crisis has remained unclear, 
especially within the context of Malaysia. Hence, it 
is pertinent to carry out a comparative study on the 
stability of Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks 
by utilising newly available data, which included the 
post crisis period.
With this in mind, our study aims to compare the 
stability of Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia 
for the period of 2004 – 2013 using financial soundness 
indicator and z-score index as indicators of bank stability. 
In addition, this paper examines the determinants of bank 
stability. Using a series of parametric and non-parametric 
tests, the results from financial soundness indicator and 
z-score index reveal that Islamic banks are found to be 
significantly less stable than conventional banks. This is 
further confirmed by the regression analysis that controls 
the Islamic banks’ dummy variables. Furthermore, the 
results of regression analysis suggest that the Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks have similar determinants 
of stability. On one hand, the bank size indicates a 
negative effect on bank stability. On the other hand, 
equity to total asset and income diversification indicate 
a positive effect on bank stability. 
This study contributes to a small but growing 
literature on the stability of Islamic banks, specifically 
with reference to the Malaysian banking sector. The study 
generalises previous comparative studies on the stability 
of Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks based on 
the following points. Firstly, the study compares the 
stability of Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia 
by employing sets of financial soundness indicators 
and z-score index over the period of 2004 – 2013. This 
covers the period of pre, during and post 2007 – 2009 
GFC. Secondly, this study examines the determinants of 
stability for the Islamic and conventional banks which 
include the impact of GFC on bank stability.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 summarises relevant literature while Section 
3 outlines the methodology and data used in this study. 
Section 4 presents the preliminary results and discusses 
the empirical findings. This is followed by a conclusion 
incorporated in the final section of this paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
THE CONCEPT OF BANK STABILITY
Banks and financial institutions act as intermediaries 
that pool funds from the surplus unit (depositors). 
The available funds are then channelled to those with 
productive investment opportunities (Schinasi 2005). 
As an intermediary of funds, banks have the capacity, 
expertise and access to important information compared 
to the surplus unit (Bessis 2010). Through banks and 
financial institutions, the surplus units are able to avoid a 
potential issue of asymmetric information which may lead 
to adverse selection and moral hazard (Heffernan 2001).
Nevertheless, should a bank fail to perform its 
function as an intermediary of funds effectively, the 
bank has the potential of becoming insolvent or too 
illiquid. When this occurs, the bank will fail to meet its 
obligations to its depositors or other creditors. In order 
to avoid this problem, an insolvent bank either will have 
to borrow from other banks or will be forced to sell its 
assets at a lower price compared to its market value in 
order to generate liquidity. However, in the event where 
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the solvent banks are unable to lend liquid money to 
the insolvent bank, a situation called bank panic will 
occur among the depositors in which most of them will 
take out their cash money from the bank. Due to these 
simultaneous actions, the bank will be incapable of 
realising the demands of all of its depositors on time. 
When this takes place, the banking system would 
not be able to channel sufficient amount of money to 
finance economic activities. This is the reason why a 
bank’s failure is widely perceived to have a great adverse 
effect on the economy as a single bank’s failure may 
potentially contribute towards a domino effect on one 
system (Caprio & Klingebiel 1997). As a result, this may 
dampen the economic growth of one country (Kaufman 
2009) as what we have witnessed in the crisis involving 
the United States financial system in 2007 – 2008.
Caprio & Klingebiel (1996) suggested that banking 
failures are more depressing for developing countries. 
This is due to the possible combination of effects with 
reductions in domestic lending, reductions in export 
earnings, and reductions in financial flows. Such adverse 
developments may result in a reduction in private sector 
investment and household consumption, an increase 
in unemployment, and disturb the flow of credit to 
individuals and firms, thus, causing an overall economic 
slowdown (Naudé 2009). 
In the case of Malaysia, more than 20 percent of 
its banking market share is contributed by the share of 
Islamic banking system. For that reason, an unstable 
Islamic banking system has the potential of harming 
the whole banking system in Malaysia. Furthermore, an 
unstable Islamic banking system may attract negative 
perception across the globe as Malaysia is one of the 
pioneers of Islamic banking industry. Therefore, it is 
important for the bank’s management and the banking 
supervisor in Malaysia to observe the level of stability of 
the Islamic banking institutions and the overall banking 
system. 
MEASURING BANK STABILITY
Literature has employed several techniques in measuring 
bank stability. These include the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. A qualitative approach was 
used by earlier research on bank stability mainly due to 
poor or non-availability of sufficient information and 
indicators that allow for quantitative analysis (Caprio & 
Klingebiel 1996). Due to the advancement in technology 
that enhances data collection and availability of data, 
several quantitative methods have been employed to 
measure bank stability. Among these methods are the 
analyses of the financial soundness indicators, z-score 
index and market-based indicators. Quantitative methods 
gain their popularity in measuring bank stability that 
can be observed in research which analyses financial 
stability and stability reports prepared by bank regulators 
(Oosterloo, de Haan and Jong-A-Pin 2007)
Despite different indicators of bank stability, there 
is no clear consensus or such widely accepted indicators 
that best measure bank stability (Segoviano & Goodhart 
2009; Čihák & Hesse 2010). Each indicator has its 
own advantages and disadvantages in measuring bank 
stability. For example, the main advantage of financial 
soundness indicator lies in the availability of data which 
can be obtained from a bank’s financial statement. 
Therefore, analysis of bank stability can be done for most 
of the banks, in contrast to market-based indicators in 
which data are not available for banks that are not publicly 
listed. Despite its capability in identifying the banking 
market’s turmoil, Čihák & Schaeck (2010) suggested that 
financial ratios analysis should be supported with other 
available quantitative methods. 
With regard to market-based indicators, several 
advantages of these indicators are worth mentioning here; 
those are the availability of data on higher frequency, 
forward-looking nature and smaller lags in comparison 
to supervisory-based data, and data which can be easily 
obtained as they are available publicly (Cihák 2006). 
Despite these advantages, market-based indicators do 
have their flaws. Market-based indicators are influenced 
by general trends in the financial markets. Therefore, 
market-based indicators may be less useful in the case 
of invalid assumptions (e.g. the underlying market is 
illiquid) or if when there are major general trends in the 
financial market. In addition, the levels of some market-
based indicators (e.g. the distance to default) are difficult 
to interpret. Therefore, it is suggested that those who 
employ these indicators should focus on the trends of 
these variables, rather than their absolute levels.
STABILITY OF ISLAMIC BANKS
Islamic banking system is developed based on the 
main sources of Islam i.e. the al-Quran and al-Hadith. 
These main sources have underlined basic principles 
in conducting Islamic banking transaction. These 
basic principles help to protect Islamic banks from the 
crisis, thus, ensuring their stability. Among these basic 
principles are the prohibition of interest-based activities 
and speculative transactions, avoidance of leverage and 
debt refinancing due to the prohibition of the sale of debt, 
matching of assets and liabilities, and the elimination 
of the multiplier effect (Iqbal & Mirakhor 2011; Iqbal, 
Askari and Krichenne 2011).
Despite the above theoretical idea, empirical 
studies that examine the stability of Islamic banks over 
conventional banks are relatively scarce. This is proven 
by the study of Belouafi et al. (2013) which discovered 
that the effort to empirically examine the stability of 
Islamic banks began after the 2007 – 2009 GFC. It begins 
with Rokhim & Gamaginta (2009) who examined the 
stability of Indonesian banking sector, then followed 
by Čihák & Hesse (2010) who investigated the role 
of Islamic banks in financial stability using data for 
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the period of 1993 – 2004 using sample of banks from 
cross-countries. 
More recently, literature can be found comparing 
the stability of Islamic and conventional banks (Hasan 
& Dridi 2010; Rajhi 2013; Beck, De Jonghe and 
Schepens 2013; Bourkhis & Nabi 2013; Pappas et al. 
2016). However, those researchers incline to focus 
on a sample of banks from cross-countries. Only few 
studies are found to focus specifically on the stability 
of Malaysian banking sector. For example, Kassim & 
Abd. Majid (2010) investigated whether Islamic banks 
in Malaysia are more resilient to the financial shocks 
compared to the conventional banks. The study which 
considered two (2) cycles of financial crisis, namely 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007 financial 
crisis, revealed that both types of banks are vulnerable 
to financial shocks. 
Mat Rahim & Zakaria (2013) examined the stability 
between Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia 
using z-score and non-performing loans as proxies 
for bank stability. Using a sample of Malaysian banks 
over the period of 2005 – 2010, the study revealed that 
Islamic banks are more stable than the conventional 
banks. In addition, Abdul Rahman & Masngut (2014) 
also employed CAMELS (capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management quality, earnings efficiency, liquidity and 
Shariah compliance ratio) ratings system to detect 
financial distress of Malaysian Islamic banks. The 
results indicate that the Islamic banks will be less 
likely to face financial distress. This is due to the good 
performance of Islamic banks as evidenced in the 
CAMELS rating system. 
Verbeet (2014) compared the stability of two (2) 
Islamic banks and three (3) conventional banks in 
Malaysia by using accounting ratios. The findings show 
that conventional banks tend to be more stable than the 
Islamic banks as they have better liquidity ratio, higher 
performance ratio and more stable capital adequacy ratio. 
Nevertheless, the study used a limited sample of banks to 
compare the stability of Islamic and conventional banks 
in Malaysia.
Results from the above-mentioned literature reveal 
unclear evidence whether Islamic banks are more stable 
than the conventional banks. Mainly, the literature is 
divided into two (2) groups, with the first group subscribes 
to the popular view that the Islamic financial system is 
more stable than the conventional financial system; 
among others are Hasan & Dridi (2010), Pappas et al. 
(2012), Beck et al. (2013), Rajhi (2013) and Mat Rahim 
& Zakaria (2013). In contrast to the first group, Rokhim 
& Gamaginta (2009), Kassim & Abd. Majid (2010) 
and Bourkhis & Nabi (2013) have demonstrated mixed 
results or no difference at all in terms of the stability of 
Islamic and conventional banks. This contradicts the 
popular belief and theoretical literature which proposes 
that the Islamic banks are more stable compared to the 
conventional banks.
With regard to literature involving Malaysian Islamic 
and conventional banks, several important points are 
relevant to be highlighted. Firstly, the analyses in those 
studies (Kassim & Abd. Majid 2010; Mat Rahim & 
Zakaria 2013; Abdul Rahman & Masngut 2014) covered 
a limited time period, i.e. from 1995 to 2010. Although all 
of these studies have taken into account the 2007 crisis 
period, they did not analyse the impact of the crisis in 
the post-crisis period. While it is useful to examine the 
degree of bank stability during the crisis period, it is also 
important to analyse the post-crisis impact as the crisis is 
still unfolding, thus, may hamper bank stability (Hasan & 
Dridi 2010). Secondly, with regard to Abdul Rahman & 
Masngut (2014), the study did not make any comparison 
between Islamic and conventional banks. Hence, there 
is no conclusion can be made whether Islamic banks are 
more stable than their conventional counterparts.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
INDICATOR OF BANK STABILITY
Bank stability is measured using the financial soundness 
indicator, following Bourkhis & Nabi (2013); and the 
z-score indicator following Čihák & Hesse (2010); Mat 
Rahim & Zakaria (2013); Rajhi (2013); Bourkhis & Nabi 
(2013). A set of financial soundness indicator used in this 
study includes the equity to total assets (ETA) as a measure 
of capital adequacy, non-performing loans (NPL) and 
loan loss reserve (LLRGL) as a measure of asset quality, 
cost to income ratio (CIR) as a measure of management 
efficiency, return on assets (ROA) as a measure of bank 
earnings and profitability, and liquid assets to deposits 
and short-term funding (LADSTF) as a measure of bank 
liquidity.
Following Čihák & Schaeck (2010), this study 
utilised another indicator, namely the z-score, as an 
alternative measure of bank stability. The z-score 
measures the probability that the value of one bank’s 
assets becomes lower than the value of the debt (Čihák & 
Hesse 2010). This indicator gains popularity because it is 
inversely related to the probability of a bank’s insolvency. 
It can be summarised as
 z ≡ (k + μ)/σ (1)
where k is an equity capital and reserves as percentage 
of assets, μ is an average return as percentage of assets, 
while σ is a standard deviation of return on assets as a 
proxy for return volatility. A higher z-score resembles a 
lower upper bound of insolvency risk, therefore, implies 
lower probability of insolvency risk.
These indicators were chosen due to their popularity 
and effectiveness in measuring bank stability as 
evidenced in previous studies. With regard to z-score, 
this indicator has been used in most studies on the 
stability of the banking institutions due to several 
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reasons. Firstly, the z-score has the ability to measure 
an individual bank’s risk. Therefore, it helps to compare 
the risk of default in different groups (Cihak 2007; Cihák 
& Hesse 2007). This feature suits the aim of this study 
in comparing the stability level between the Islamic 
and conventional banks. Secondly, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache (2009) suggested that the z-score index 
is the improvement of the measures used by previous 
studies which employed accounting ratios such as NPL, 
loan spread, interest margin, and capital adequacy 
to measure bank stability. Thirdly, this indicator can 
be used for institutions in which more sophisticated 
market data are not available. For all these reasons, 
the z-score is expected to be an appropriate indicator 
for this study, especially in comparing the stability of 
Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks in addition 
to the financial soundness indicator analysis.
DATA AND METHOD
Data for the empirical analysis were extracted 
from financial statements of Malaysian Islamic and 
conventional banks over the period of 2004 – 2013. These 
financial statements were obtained from the website 
of each individual bank. We choose a sample of banks 
that have at least six (6) years of their latest financial 
statements. This is preferred so that bank stability can be 
observed during crisis and post-crisis periods. This leaves 
us with 17 Islamic banks and 21 conventional banks, 
which is equivalent to 80.85 percent of all Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks. Table 1 describes the 
sample of banks by their type.
Parametric (t-test) and non-parametric tests (Mann-
Whitney (MW) and Kolmogorov Smirnov (KS)) had 
been carried out in order to compare the mean of 
financial soundness indicators and z-score for Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks for all periods and each 
sub-period. Subsequently, we performed pooled OLS 
regression analysis to examine the type of bank that is 
more stable and to investigate the determinants of stability 
for Islamic and conventional banks for all the sub-periods. 
In light of the regression analysis, the z-score for each 
bank i and time t were constructed. Based on the panel 
data analysis, a modified version of Mat Rahim & Zakaria 
(2013) was estimated in order to test for the effect of 
the financial crisis while controlling the bank’s specific 
variables and macroeconomic variables:
Zit = α + β1IBDUMMY + β2LN(TA)it +  
β3ETAit + β4NPLit + β5CIRit + β6ROAit + 
β7INCDIVit + β8NLTAit + β9HSTATt + 
β10GDPt + β11INFt + β12PERIOD + εit (2)
where the dependent variable is the z-score for bank i 
at time t; while controlling elements for bank specific 
factors, market structure and macroeconomic variables. 
Our main variable of interest is the IBDUMMY, represented 
by 1 if the type of bank is Islamic, while 0 if the type is 
conventional bank. 
The control elements is then followed by set of bank 
specific factors; namely the natural log of total assets 
(LN(TA)) to control for effects of size, the equity to total 
assets (ETA) to assess the impact of capital adequacy, the 
non-performing loans (NPL) to control the bank credit risk 
(non-performing loans), the cost to income ratio (CIR) to 
control the efficiency of bank’s management, the return 
on assets (ROA) to assess the effect of profitability, the 
income diversification (INCDIV) to control the extent of 
banks that diversifies from traditional lending/financing 
activities, the net loans to total assets (NLTA) to assess the 
impact of loan (financing) growth. 
In addition, the market structure is controlled by 
using Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (HSTAT) and is estimated 
based on total revenue equation as stated below:
ln TREVit = α0 + α1 ln PLit + α2 ln PKit + 
α3 ln PFit + ∑ ζj ln BSFit + εit (3)
for t = 1,…,T, where T is the number of periods observed 
and i = 1,…,I, where I is the total number of banks in the 
sample. Subscripts i and t refer to bank i and at time t. 
The total revenue is used as a dependent variable. Bandt 
& Davis (2000); Nathan & Neave (1989), among others, 
suggest that banks have been actively generating income 
from non-interest sources, namely on fee based and other 
off-balance sheet activities. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
consider the total revenue as the dependent variable PLit 
is the price of labour of bank i at time t, PKit is the price 
of capital of bank i at time t and PPit is the price of funds 
of bank i at time t. The ratio of personnel expenses to total 
assets is used as a proxy for price of labour, followed by 
the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses 
to total assets is used as a proxy for price of capital, and 
finally the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits is 
used as a proxy for price of funds.
Furthermore, macroeconomic condition is controlled 
using GDP growth and inflation. Also, the PERIOD dummy 
variables which represent different sub-periods are also 
included, namely pre-crisis (2004 – 2007), crisis (2008 – 
2009) and post-crisis periods (2010 – 2013). In order to 
determine the specific year of crisis, the macroeconomic 
indicator namely the GDP growth is used. The trend 
of GDP growth has the ability to provide indication 
between normal time and the crisis period (Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1996; Hardy & Pazarbasioglu, 1998). Based 
on the World Development Indicator of the World Bank, 
it has been observed that the GDP growth in Malaysia 
TABLE 1. Number of banks vs. sample of banks
By type Islamic 
bank
Conventional 
bank
Total
Number of banks 20 27 47
Sample of banks 17 21 38
Percentage of sample 
(%)
85% 77.78% 80.85%
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deteriorated between the period of 2008 and 2009 from 
the rating between 4.83 and -1.51, respectively. This 
indicates the year in which the impact of the 2007 to 
2009 global financial crisis reached Malaysia. Finally, 
εit is the residual. 
Table 2 presents the definition of variables used in 
this study, as well as the expected results.
In order to examine the determinants of bank stability 
for Islamic and conventional banks, estimation is carried 
out with the following equation.
Zit = α + β1LN(TA)it + β2ETAit + β3NPLit + 
β4CIRit + β5ROAit + β6INCDIVit + 
β7NLTAit + β8HSTATt + β9GDPt + 
β10INFt + β11PERIOD + εit (4)
Details of the variables used in equation (4) are 
defined in Table 2.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
TABLE 3 presents descriptive statistics of variables used 
in this study. Total assets variable is in natural logarithm 
form, while other bank specific variables are in the form 
of financial ratios. In total, the number of observations 
for Islamic banks for each variable varies from 120 to 
132. This is due to the fact that some Islamic banks were 
newly established during the early period of observation 
and did not report some data required for this study. In 
contrast, the numbers of observations for conventional 
banks are 210.
Based on the statistics, on one hand, we found that 
the mean score of conventional banks is better than 
Islamic banks in terms of z-score, LN(TA), NPL, CIR and 
ROA. On the other hand, we found that Islamic banks 
are better than conventional banks in terms of ETA and 
INCDIV.
In addition, we conducted correlation analysis on 
independent variables used in this study. Table 4 presents 
the result of correlation analysis. Based on this analysis, 
the result indicates no serious multicollinearity issue 
involving variables used in the regression analysis.
BASIC COMPARISON
A series of parametric (t-test) and non-parametric tests 
(MW and KS) were carried out in order to compare the 
mean of stability indicators for Islamic and conventional 
banks over the entire period (2004-2013), pre-crisis 
(2004-2007), crisis (2008-2009), and post-crisis (2010-
2013) periods. The results are presented in Table 5. 
First, the z-score results of the Malaysian Islamic 
banks are presented. In addition, the trend of z-score 
for Islamic and conventional banks from 2004 to 2013 
is presented in Figure 1. Over the entire period of 
observation, the z-score of Malaysian Islamic banks 
TABLE 2. Description of the variables used in the regression models
Variable Description Expected sign
Dependent  
Z-score Z-score is measured by (ROA+ETA)/Standard Deviation of ROA NA
Independent Bank characteristics
LN(TA) Natural log of total assets +/-
ETA Total book value of shareholders equity over total assets +/-
NPL Non-performing loans over gross loans -
NLTA Net loans to total assets +/-
CIR Cost to income ratio -
ROA Return on assets +
INCDIV Income diversification measured by (net interest income – other operating income)/
total operating income
+/-
Economic and financial market conditions
GDP Gross domestic products (growth) +
INF Inflation -
HSTAT Panzar-Rosse H-statistics +/-
Pre-Crisis Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for pre-crisis period, 0 otherwise +
Crisis Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for during crisis period, 0 otherwise -
Post-Crisis Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for post-crisis period, 0 otherwise +
Islamic Banks Dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for Islamic banks, 0 for conventional banks. +/-
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics
Bank Type Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Bank-specific variables
z-score Islamic 131 29.006 34.519 -3.207 271.149
Conventional 210 35.798 21.640 5.114 113.065
LN(TA) Islamic 132 15.864 1.397 10.154 18.644
Conventional 210 16.901 1.586 13.661 19.801
ETA Islamic 132 12.893 17.101 -1.902 100.000
Conventional 210 11.311 6.844 3.570 37.239
NPL Islamic 120 4.004 4.920 0.070 23.230
Conventional 210 3.776 3.792 0.010 26.400
NLTA Islamic 128 52.399 17.144 0.830 77.740
Conventional 210 47.943 21.886 0.420 89.730
CIR Islamic 120 58.509 67.240 21.200 760.780
Conventional 210 43.031 13.328 18.540 109.910
ROA Islamic 131 0.218 2.671 -25.780 2.080
Conventional 210 1.160 0.520 -0.980 3.050
INCDIV Islamic 131 0.827 0.131 0.230 1.000
Conventional 210 0.538 0.240 -0.801 0.988
Market competition and macroeconomic variables
HSTAT 380 0.453 0.246 0.148 0.902
GDP 380 5.02 2.325 -1.5 7.4
INF 380 2.48 1.292 0.6 5.4
Notes: LN(TA) is natural log of total assets. ETA is equity to total assets. NPL is non-performing loans. NLTA is net loans to total assets. CIR is 
cost to income ratio. ROA is return on assets. INCDIV is income diversification. HSTAT is Panzar-Rosse H-statistic. GDP is gross domestic 
products. INF is inflation. 
TABLE 4. Correlation analysis
Islamic 
dummy LN(TA) ETA NPL CIR ROA INCDIV NLTA HSTAT GDP INF
Islamic 
dummy 1.000
LN(TA) -0.215 1.000
ETA -0.216 -0.674 1.000
NPL 0.041 0.037 -0.079 1.000
CIR 0.266 -0.194 -0.018 0.239 1.000
ROA -0.335 0.159 0.099 -0.413 -0.599 1.000
INCDIV 0.560 0.003 -0.231 0.002 -0.003 -0.219 1.000
NLTA 0.188 0.458 -0.352 -0.030 -0.228 0.013 0.431 1.000
HSTAT -0.053 -0.066 -0.023 0.066 -0.120 0.005 0.020 -0.080 1.000
GDP -0.078 0.015 0.001 0.110 -0.006 0.038 -0.039 -0.007 -0.175 1.000
INF -0.016 -0.014 -0.055 0.005 -0.064 -0.011 0.048 -0.028 0.554 0.305 1.000
Notes: LN(TA) is natural log of total assets. ETA is equity to total assets. NPL is non-performing loans. NLTA is net loans to total assets. CIR is cost 
to income ratio. ROA is return on assets. INCDIV is income diversification. GDP is gross domestic products. INF is inflation.
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TABLE 5. Means comparison of the stability indicators
Stability 
indicator
Periods
Type of 
banks Obs Mean Std.Dev
P value 
(t-test)
P value 
(MW)
P value 
(KS)
z-score Overall period Islamic 131 29.01 34.5219 0.0131** 0.000*** 0.000***
  Conv. 210 35.80 21.64    
 Pre-crisis Islamic 29 34.54 43.517 0.4005 0.040** 0.014**
  Conv. 84 36.19 24.084    
 Crisis Islamic 34 32.59 47.035 0.3349 0.034** 0.030**
  Conv. 42 36.08 21.772    
 Post-crisis Islamic 68 24.85 19.839 0.0006*** 0.000*** 0.001***
  Conv. 84 35.27 19.092    
ETA Overall period Islamic 132 12.89 17.101 0.1159 0.018** 0.029**
  Conv. 210 11.31 6.844    
 Pre-crisis Islamic 30 23.57 31.389 0.0010*** 0.408 0.34
  Conv. 84 11.73 8.567    
 Crisis Islamic 34 11.10 11.021 0.4736 0.135 0.132
  Conv. 42 11.24 6.459    
 Post-crisis Islamic 68 9.08 4.249 0.0074*** 0.001*** 0.005***
  Conv. 84 10.93 4.86    
NPL Overall period Islamic 120 4.00 4.92 0.3193 0.182 0.010***
  Conv. 210 3.78 3.792    
 Pre-crisis Islamic 24 7.19 7.008 0.1512 0.973 0.326
  Conv. 84 5.92 4.702    
 Crisis Islamic 31 3.57 4.279 0.174 0.635 0.219
  Conv. 42 2.85 2.178    
 Post-crisis Islamic 65 3.03 3.731 0.0244** 0.241 0.122
  Conv. 84 2.09 1.948    
LLRGL Overall period Islamic 123 3.44 2.96 0.4475 0.044* 0.004***
  Conv. 210 3.47 2.48    
 Pre-crisis Islamic 24 4.71 3.804 0.4556 0.281 0.081*
  Conv. 84 4.63 2.803    
 Crisis Islamic 32 3.46 2.478 0.4364 0.321 0.282
  Conv. 42 3.37 1.887    
 Post-crisis Islamic 66 2.93 2.698 0.0592* 0.231 0.529
  Conv. 84 2.35 1.788    
CIR Overall period Islamic 120 58.51 67.24 0.0007*** 0.000*** 0.000***
  Conv. 210 43.03 13.328    
 Pre-crisis Islamic 21 88.44 155.06 0.0028*** 0.000*** 0.004***
  Conv. 84 40.67 11.616    
 Crisis Islamic 31 50.32 22.356 0.0095*** 0.032** 0.075*
  Conv. 42 41.13 9.352    
 Post-crisis Islamic 68 53.00 16.928 0.0067*** 0.010*** 0.003***
  Conv. 84 46.34 15.831    
ROA Overall period Islamic 131 0.22 2.671 0.0000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
  Conv. 210 1.16 0.52    
 Pre-crisis Islamic 29 -1.20 5.275 0.0000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
  Conv. 84 1.18 0.622    
 Crisis Islamic 34 0.57 0.707 0.0000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
  Conv. 42 1.16 0.468    
 Post-crisis Islamic 68 0.65 0.919 0.0000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
  Conv. 84 1.14 0.43    
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stands at 29.01. Interestingly, when the z-score of 
Malaysian Islamic banks were examined based on 
different sub-periods, we found that the z-score for 
Malaysian Islamic banks indicates a declining trend. For 
the pre-crisis period, the z-score of Malaysian Islamic 
banks is 34.54, while during crisis period; the z-score for 
Malaysian Islamic banks reduces to 32.59. The z-score of 
Malaysian Islamic banks further reduces to 24.85 during 
the post-crisis period.
Next, the z-score results of the Malaysian 
conventional banks are presented. Over the entire period 
of observation, the z-score of the Malaysian conventional 
banks stands at 35.80. For the case of pre-crisis period, 
the z-score of the Malaysian conventional banks is 36.19. 
The z-score of the Malaysian conventional banks is 36.08 
during the crisis period. Whereas, during the post-crisis 
period; the z-score of the Malaysian conventional banks 
stands at 35.27. Similarly, like the z-score results of 
the Malaysian Islamic banks, the z-score results of the 
Malaysian conventional banks also indicate a declining 
trend from one sub-period to another. Nevertheless, the 
z-score of the Malaysian conventional banks demonstrates 
a more stable trend compared to the trend of z-score of 
the Malaysian Islamic banks.
When the z-score results of the Malaysian Islamic 
and conventional banks were compared, we found that 
the z-score of the Malaysian Islamic banks is generally 
lower than the z-score of the Malaysian conventional 
banks. This can be observed from the z-score results of 
the entire periods as well as in all sub-periods. Results 
of both parametric and non-parametric tests are highly 
signifi cant over the entire periods as well as during the 
post-crisis period. In addition, for pre-crisis and during 
crisis periods, the MW and KS tests reveal a signifi cant 
result. Therefore, it is clear that the Islamic banks are less 
stable than the conventional banks. 
In addition to the z-score, this study also compares 
the stability of Malaysian Islamic and conventional 
banks using the fi nancial soundness indicators. The 
capital adequacy which is measured using equity to total 
assets suggests that Islamic banks are well-capitalised in 
comparison to conventional banks over all the periods as 
well as during the pre-crisis period. The equity to total 
assets for Islamic banks over the entire period is 12.89 
percent compared to conventional banks of 11.31 percent. 
Likewise, the Islamic banks’ equity to total assets during 
the pre-crisis period is 23.57 percent, which is higher 
than the equity to total assets of conventional banks at 
11.31 percent. The non-parametric test indicates that 
results for over the entire period are signifi cant while 
the t-test for pre-crisis period is highly signifi cant at 
1 percent level. However, the equity to total assets for 
LADSTF Overall period Islamic 128 42.35 56.26 0.2169 0.116 0.106
 Conv. 210 46.20 33.9    
Pre-crisis Islamic 26 81.18 108.907 0.0072*** 0.027** 0.050**
 Conv. 84 47.91 32.429    
Crisis Islamic 34 42.75 33.058 0.3929 0.397 0.183
 Conv. 42 44.92 35.714    
Post-crisis Islamic 68 27.31 14.874 0.0001*** 0.007*** 0.021**
 Conv. 84 45.12 34.735    
Notes: MW = Mann-Whitney. KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov. ETA = equity to total assets. NPL = non-performing loans. LLRGL = loan loss reserve 
to gross loans. CIR = cost to income ratio. ROA = return on assets. LADSTF = liquid assets to total assets
FIGURE 1. Z-score comparison of Islamic and 
conventional banks (2004 - 2013)
FIGURE 2. Equity to total assets comparison of Islamic 
and conventional banks (2004 - 2013)
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Islamic banks has reduced tremendously to 11.10 percent 
during the crisis period, which is similar to the equity 
to total assets of conventional banks which reduced 
to 11.24 percent. For post-crisis period, the equity to 
total assets for Islamic banks is 9.08 percent, which is 
lower than the conventional banks of 10.93 percent. 
Both parametric and non-parametric tests for post-crisis 
period are highly signifi cant at 1 percent level. This 
recommends that although the equity to total assets for 
Islamic banks is higher over the entire period compared 
to the conventional banks, the level of capitalisation 
of Islamic banks has reduced from one sub-period to 
another. This would trigger a potential problem in the 
stability of Malaysian Islamic banks in the near future. 
Figure 2 presents the trend of equity to total assets 
for Malaysian Islamic banks and conventional banks 
over the period from 2004 to 2013. From 2004 to 2008, 
the equity to total assets for Islamic banks remained 
higher than the conventional banks. However, the post-
crisis period exhibits that the equity to total assets for 
conventional banks is higher than of the equity to total 
assets for Islamic banks.
Subsequently, the non-performing loans and the loan 
loss reserve to gross loans are used to measure the asset 
quality of Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks. 
Over the entire period and sub-periods of observations, 
it is found that the asset quality of conventional banks is 
better than the Islamic banks. The trend of non-performing 
loans for both Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks 
is presented in Figure 3, which confi rms the observation. 
Nevertheless, all the t-test results are not signifi cant 
across the sub-periods of observations, except for the 
t-test of non-performing loans during the post-crisis 
period, which is signifi cant at 5 percent level. Similarly, it 
has been observed that the loan loss reserve to gross loans 
ratios for both the Malaysian Islamic and conventional 
banks indicates a similar trend. However, in most cases 
as presented in Figure 4, Malaysian Islamic banks have 
more reserves compared to the conventional counterparts.
FIGURE 3. Non-performing loans comparison of Islamic and 
conventional banks (2004 - 2013)
FIGURE 4. Loan loss reserve comparison of Islamic and 
conventional banks (2004 - 2013)
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Furthermore, the management effi ciency of Islamic 
and conventional banks was compared by using the cost 
to income ratio. This ratio shows the bank’s costs with 
respect to its income. Banks with lower cost to income 
ratio indicate better effi ciency. When the overall period 
was considered, the cost to income ratio for Islamic 
banks is 58.51 percent compared to 43.03 percent for 
conventional banks. During the pre-crisis period, the 
cost to income ratio of Islamic banks is 88.44 percent 
compared to the cost to income ratio of conventional 
banks at 40.67 percent. For the crisis period, the cost to 
income ratio of Islamic banks improved to 50.32 percent 
compared to the cost to income ratio of conventional 
banks at 41.13 percent. In the post-crisis period, the cost 
to income ratio of Islamic banks is 53 percent compared 
to 46.34 percent of conventional banks. The t-test results 
of cost to income ratio for both Malaysian Islamic and 
conventional banks are signifi cant at 1 percent level. 
Observation on the trend of cost to income ratio in Figure 
5 over the entire period indicates that the cost to income 
ratio for conventional banks is better than Islamic banks.
This study also took into account the earnings 
and profi tability by using return on assets, in which 
conventional banks exhibit higher return on assets than 
Islamic banks over the entire period of observations 
and for all the sub-periods. Over the entire period, the 
return on assets for Islamic banks is at 0.22 percent in 
comparison to 1.16 percent for conventional banks. 
Similarly, during the pre-crisis period, the return on 
assets for Islamic banks is at -1.20 percent compared 
to 1.18 percent for conventional banks. This is in 
contrast to the crisis period in which the return on assets 
for Islamic banks is at 0.57 percent in comparison to 
conventional banks of 1.16 percent. Lastly, during the 
post-crisis period, the return on assets for Islamic banks 
is 0.65 percent, which is lower than the conventional 
banks of 1.14 percent. The t-test, MW and KS tests are 
highly signifi cant at 1 percent level. These observations 
reveal that conventional banks are more profi table, thus, 
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more stable than Islamic banks. Figure 6 presents the 
trend of return on assets for both Malaysian Islamic and 
conventional banks over the period of observation.
Lastly, a comparison was carried out on the liquidity 
ratio of Islamic and conventional banks by using liquid 
assets to deposits and short-term funding. Over the 
entire period, t-test, MW and KS tests could not reject 
the hypothesis that liquidity ratio for both Islamic and 
conventional banks over the entire period and during 
crisis period is at the same level. However, for the pre-
crisis period, it is observed that the liquidity of Islamic 
banks is at 81.18 percent, which possesses more liquidity 
than conventional banks of 47.91 percent. This result 
might be due to the availability of liquidity instrument 
for Islamic banks during the pre-crisis period, which 
is limited. Furthermore, the results are signifi cant at 1 
percent and 5 percent levels when the t-test and both non-
parametric tests were used. In contrast, during crisis and 
post-crisis periods, the observations evidence a reduction 
in liquidity ratio for Islamic banks. Specifi cally, in the 
post-crisis period, the liquidity ratio for Islamic banks 
result is 27.31 percent, which is lower than conventional 
banks of 45.12 percent. The results for both parametric 
and non-parametric tests for post-crisis period are highly 
significant. Moreover, the results also indicate that 
Islamic banks are more vulnerable to crisis and, therefore, 
less stable than the conventional counterparts. It is also 
important to note that the liquidity of Islamic banks has 
reduced over the period of observation. An illiquid asset 
may be vulnerable for Islamic banks as they may drag 
the institution towards liquidity crisis. This potential 
problem should be emphasised by the Islamic banks in the 
near future. The trend of liquid assets of both Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks from 2004 to 2013 is 
presented in Figure 7.
In summary, the comparison of the mean of stability 
indicators suggests that in most cases, the Malaysian 
conventional banks are more stable than the Malaysian 
Islamic banks. The results only fi nd that Islamic banks are 
more stable for the three following observations, which 
are the equity to total assets over the entire period, pre-
crisis period and liquid assets for the pre-crisis period. 
Furthermore, in most cases, the results of parametric and 
non-parametric tests are signifi cant, suggesting that the 
FIGURE 5. Cost to income ratio comparison of Islamic 
and conventional banks (2004 - 2013)
FIGURE 6. Return on assets comparison of Islamic 
banks and conventional banks (2004 - 2013)
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FIGURE 7. Liquid assets to deposits comparison of Islamic banks and conventional banks (2004 - 2013)
Liquid assets to deposits comparison
 Islamic banks  Conventional banks
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
140.00
120.00
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
122 Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 50(1)
differences between stability indicators of Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks are different.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Stability of Islamic Versus Conventional Banks To 
examine the robustness of results in section 4.2, this study 
conducted an estimation of the pooled OLS regression 
analysis using equation 2. The analyses control the 
Islamic banks dummy variable, bank-specific factors, 
market competition and macroeconomic factors. The 
results of the pooled OLS regression analysis are presented 
in Table 6.
Six (6) regression models are estimated. Model 
1 includes Islamic banks dummy and bank-specific 
variables. Model 2 includes all variables used in Model 
TABLE 6. Regression analysis with Islamic bank’s dummy variablesa
Estimator OLS
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Islamic dummy -13.90*** -13.98*** -14.03*** -14.09*** -14.04*** -14.08***
(2.969) (2.977) (3.012) (3.139) (3.028) (3.135)
LN(TA) -3.337*** -3.383*** -3.392*** -3.413*** -3.392*** -3.415***
(1.098) (1.106) (1.122) (1.176) (1.125) (1.199)
ETA 0.931*** 0.921*** 0.917*** 0.914*** 0.917*** 0.914***
(0.294) (0.299) (0.303) (0.313) (0.304) (0.314)
NPL -0.230 -0.225 -0.225 -0.214 -0.225 -0.213
(0.232) (0.233) (0.243) (0.280) (0.243) (0.292)
CIR -0.137** -0.140** -0.140** -0.142** -0.140** -0.141**
(0.0668) (0.0673) (0.0675) (0.0694) (0.0680) (0.0690)
ROA 2.484* 2.468* 2.467* 2.472* 2.464* 2.479*
(1.293) (1.288) (1.315) (1.324) (1.322) (1.338)
INCDIV 8.811** 8.903** 8.979** 8.986** 8.984** 8.978**
(4.255) (4.274) (4.290) (4.285) (4.302) (4.291)
NLTA 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.0602) (0.0607) (0.0610) (0.0608) (0.0611) (0.0609)
HSTAT -1.152 -0.323 -0.140 -0.414 0.0433
(4.302) (5.826) (6.139) (6.560) (7.331)
GDP -0.0407 -0.0206 -0.0205 -0.0544
(0.524) (0.570) (0.835) (0.559)
INF -0.301 -0.329 -0.313 -0.311
(1.076) (1.124) (1.145) (1.083)
Pre-crisis -0.256
(3.075)
During crisis 0.160
(5.182)
Post-crisis 0.287
(3.687)
Constant 72.43*** 74.02*** 74.76*** 75.15*** 74.70*** 75.00***
(20.47) (21.18) (21.89) (22.99) (21.97) (22.58)
Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324
R-squared 0.297 0.297 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298
Notes: LN(TA) is a natural log of total assets. ETA is an equity to total assets. NPL is non-performing loans. NLTA is net loans to total assets. 
CIR is a cost to income ratio. ROA is a return on assets. INCDIV is an income diversification. HSTAT is H-statistic based on total revenue 
derived from Panzar-Rosse method. GDP is gross a domestic products growth. INF is an inflation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 a The equation: Zit = α + β1IBDUMMY + β2LN(TA)it + β3ETAit + β4NPLit + β5CIRit + β6ROAit + β7INCDIVit + β8NLTAit + β9HSTATt + β10GDPt 
+ β11INFt + β12PERIOD + εit
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1 and market competition. Model 3 includes all variables 
used in Model 2 and macroeconomic variables. Models 
4, 5 and 6 include all variables used in Model 3 and 
the sub-period dummy variables, namely the pre-crisis, 
during crisis and post-crisis, respectively. Overall, the 
coefficient of most variables used in the regression 
models depicts similar outcome compared to previous 
studies. In addition, these coefficients’ outcomes remain 
the same across all regression models that are estimated. 
Therefore, it demonstrates the precise fitting of the 
proposed regression models.
From the results of regression analysis in Table 6, 
it can be observed that the coefficient of the primary 
variable of interest, namely the Islamic banks’ dummy 
variable indicates a negative sign and highly significant 
at 1 percent level across all models (1 to 6). This 
reveals that Islamic banks in Malaysia are less stable 
than conventional banks. The results remain the same 
when the control element is applied for different sub-
periods, including pre-crisis, during crisis and post-
crisis periods. This confirmed the earlier comparison 
result that compared the mean of z-score in Section 
4.2. The finding is in line with the findings of Rokhim 
& Gamaginta (2009) and Shafik (2014), which also 
reveal that Islamic banks within their samples tend to 
have significantly lower level of stability compared to 
conventional banks.
Subsequently, a similar regression model is estimated 
based on different bank sizes. For this purpose, banks in 
the sample are categorised into small and large banks 
based on the total assets. Banks with total assets from 
RM 25.7 million to RM 10.0 billion are considered as 
small banks, whilst banks with total assets of RM 10.0 
billion and above are considered as large banks. Table 7 
presents the pooled OLS regression results for large banks, 
while Table 8 presents the pooled OLS regression results 
for small banks.
On one hand, the coefficient results of Islamic 
banks’ dummy variable in Models 1 to 6 of Table 7 
indicate a negative sign and highly significant at 1 
percent level. This reveals that the large Islamic banks 
are significantly less stable than the large conventional 
banks. This result concurs with the findings of Čihák & 
Hesse (2010) and Abedifar et al. (2013), in which these 
authors investigated a cross-countries sample and found 
that large conventional banks tend to be stronger than 
large Islamic banks.
On the other hand, the coefficient results of Islamic 
banks’ dummy variable in Models 1 to 6 of Table 8 
indicate a positive sign. This result reveals that the 
small Islamic banks are more stable than the small 
conventional banks. This result is in consensus with the 
findings of Čihák & Hesse (2010) and Abedifar et al. 
(2013). However, the result is in contrast to the finding 
of Rajhi (2013), in which a cross-countries study found 
that small Islamic banks tend to be less stable than 
small conventional banks. Nevertheless, the coefficient 
results for small Islamic banks dummy variables are 
insignificant.
Determinants of Stability To examine the 
determinants of stability for Islamic and conventional 
banks, six (6) models were estimated based on pooled 
OLS regression by using Equation 4. The regression 
analysis was carried out separately for Islamic and 
conventional banks. Model 1 includes bank-specific 
variables. Model 2 includes bank-specific variables and 
market competition. Model 3 includes all variables used 
in Model 2 and macroeconomic variables. Models 4, 
5 and 6 include all variables used in Model 3 and sub-
period dummy variables of pre-crisis, during crisis and 
post-crisis periods, respectively. 
Table 9 presents the regression results for Islamic 
banks while Table 10 presents the regression results for 
conventional banks. In general, most of the variables 
used in the regression models indicate the expected sign 
and are similar to previous literature. In addition, the 
sign of coefficient remains the same across all models, 
therefore, resulted in a good fitness to the proposed 
regression models.
Determinants of Stability for Islamic Banks Firstly, 
the results of regression analysis for Islamic banks are 
reported in Table 9. The coefficient signs for natural log 
of total assets, which is a proxy for bank size, indicate 
a negative sign throughout the regression models. The 
results are significant at a minimum level of 5 percent 
and suggest that an increase in the size of Islamic banks 
tends to decrease its level of stability. The findings of 
this proposed research are in line with previous studies 
by Bourkhis & Nabi (2013), De Jonghe (2010), Čihák 
& Hesse (2010), and Rajhi (2013). The outcome can 
be justified simply because larger banks will normally 
be exposed to a major amount of risks. In contrast, the 
smaller banks with limited capacity would not be exposed 
to businesses with a larger amount of risks. Therefore, 
larger banks are more vulnerable to a critical situation, 
especially during adverse economic conditions (De 
Jonghe, 2010).
In addition, the sign of coefficient for equity to total 
assets, which is the proxy for the level of bank’s capital 
adequacy, is positive and significant at the minimum 
level of 10 percent throughout the regression models. 
The results indicate that an increase in the level of 
capitalisations of Islamic banks would consequently 
increase the level of stability. This is expected and in 
consonance with the previous literature, among others 
are Degryse et al. (2013), Beck et al. (2013), Beck et al. 
(2010), and Tagkalakis (2014). As a result, a strong capital 
adequacy portrays the ability of a bank to remain stable, 
especially during the turbulence period. In addition, the 
bank that has a good level of capital will gain consumer’s 
confidence, hence, the customers will continue using the 
banking facilities and services (Hussein, 2010).
As expected, the sign of coefficient for non-
performing loans, which is the proxy for asset quality, is 
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negative throughout the regression models. The results 
are highly significant at 1 percent level, thus, revealing 
that an increase in non-performing loans of Islamic banks 
tends to reduce its level of stability. These results are in 
line with the findings of Rajhi (2013), Čihák & Hesse 
(2010), Tagkalakis (2014), and Godlewski (2006). The 
negative relationship between non-performing loan and 
bank stability is possible as an increase in non-performing 
loans could cause cash flow problems and affects a 
bank’s liquidity. Such scenario will expose the bank to 
the vulnerable situation.
TABLE 7. Regression analysis with Islamic bank’s dummy variables based on large banksa
Estimator OLS
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Islamic dummy -25.91*** -26.92*** -27.26*** -30.39*** -27.23*** -30.96***
(4.226) (4.175) (4.211) (4.493) (4.218) (4.522)
LN(TA) -11.48*** -11.72*** -11.87*** -12.79*** -11.87*** -13.20***
(1.692) (1.701) (1.717) (1.751) (1.721) (1.750)
ETA -0.206 -0.375 -0.407 -0.950** -0.400 -1.029**
(0.420) (0.416) (0.420) (0.470) (0.429) (0.459)
NPL -0.464 -0.342 -0.262 0.244 -0.262 0.448
(0.281) (0.291) (0.295) (0.330) (0.296) (0.334)
CIR 0.0950 0.0514 0.0483 -0.0253 0.0483 -0.0545
(0.147) (0.152) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.149)
ROA 4.401*** 4.300*** 4.468*** 4.476*** 4.488*** 4.923***
(1.543) (1.456) (1.451) (1.392) (1.466) (1.463)
INCDIV 5.771 6.635 6.226 5.152 6.231 4.824
(7.976) (8.204) (8.340) (8.341) (8.342) (7.537)
NLTA 0.449*** 0.425*** 0.427*** 0.414*** 0.427*** 0.405***
(0.107) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.107)
HSTAT -8.168 -12.53 -7.832 -12.19 1.933
(5.608) (7.600) (7.882) (8.590) (9.128)
GDP -0.592 0.0664 -0.665 -1.330**
(0.643) (0.720) (1.067) (0.667)
INF 0.995 -0.0503 1.039 0.521
(1.341) (1.458) (1.462) (1.362)
Pre-crisis -9.438**
(4.120)
During crisis -0.586
(6.734)
Post-crisis 13.41***
(4.609)
Constant 204.6*** 216.3*** 221.4*** 245.2*** 221.6*** 245.8***
(30.13) (31.21) (31.97) (32.93) (32.03) (32.16)
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199
R-squared 0.271 0.279 0.283 0.302 0.283 0.311
Notes: LN(TA) is a natural log of total assets. ETA is an equity to total assets. NPL is non-performing loans. NLTA is net loans to total assets. 
CIR is a cost to income ratio. ROA is a return on assets. INCDIV is an income diversification. HSTAT is H-statistic based on total revenue 
derived from Panzar-Rosse method. GDP is a gross domestic products growth. INF is an inflation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 a The equation: Zit = α + β1IBDUMMY + β2LN(TA)it + β3ETAit + β4NPLit + β5CIRit + β6ROAit + β7INCDIVit + β8NLTAit + β9HSTATt + β10GDPt 
+ β11INFt + β12PERIOD + εit
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Similarly, the sign of coefficient for the cost to income 
ratio, which is the proxy for management efficiency, is 
negative and highly significant at 1 percent level of the 
regression models that are estimated. An increase in 
cost to income ratio is tantamount to a lower degree of 
management efficiency. Therefore, a negative coefficient 
suggests that an increase in cost to income ratio would 
lead to a decrease in bank stability. The findings of this 
proposed work support the previous literature such as 
Rajhi (2013), Beck et al. (2009), Bourkhis & Nabi (2013) 
and Čihák & Hesse (2010).
In addition, the regression results reveal a positive 
coefficient sign of INCDIV, which is the proxy for income 
diversification. The results are significant at 5 percent 
level throughout the regression models. It is clear from 
the results that an increase in income diversification 
TABLE 8. Regression analysis with Islamic bank’s dummy variables based on small banksa
Estimator OLS
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Islamic dummy 7.692 7.729 7.617 7.636 7.524 7.585
(4.704) (4.784) (4.911) (4.882) (4.965) (4.989)
LN(TA) -5.480 -5.501 -5.137 -5.230 -4.958 -5.028
(5.271) (5.387) (5.631) (5.658) (5.831) (5.949)
ETA 1.746*** 1.744*** 1.758*** 1.761*** 1.776*** 1.759***
(0.411) (0.421) (0.425) (0.425) (0.439) (0.429)
NPL -1.140*** -1.145*** -1.175*** -1.136*** -1.151*** -1.203***
(0.320) (0.317) (0.326) (0.388) (0.315) (0.405)
CIR -0.358*** -0.360*** -0.360*** -0.365*** -0.362*** -0.356***
(0.0874) (0.0910) (0.0922) (0.0946) (0.0913) (0.0961)
ROA -1.181 -1.191 -1.388 -1.278 -1.261 -1.460
(1.552) (1.562) (1.600) (1.674) (1.578) (1.671)
INCDIV 12.79 12.77 12.80 13.10 13.52 12.67
(8.780) (8.813) (9.131) (9.009) (9.229) (9.078)
NLTA -0.161* -0.162* -0.160* -0.165* -0.168** -0.157*
(0.0815) (0.0825) (0.0826) (0.0837) (0.0824) (0.0826)
HSTAT -0.380 4.380 5.203 1.210 3.141
(5.584) (7.602) (8.113) (8.205) (9.369)
GDP 0.310 0.397 1.015 0.356
(0.725) (0.783) (1.088) (0.778)
INF -1.300 -1.414 -1.723 -1.275
(1.515) (1.546) (1.590) (1.519)
Pre-crisis -1.136
(4.393)
During crisis 5.642
(6.814)
Post-crisis -0.964
(5.060)
Constant 109.5 110.1 104.2 105.5 98.85 103.2
(87.91) (91.45) (95.43) (95.71) (99.80) (99.01)
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125
R-squared 0.595 0.595 0.598 0.598 0.601 0.598
Notes: LN(TA) is a natural log of total assets. ETA is an equity to total assets. NPL is non-performing loans. NLTA is net loans to total assets. 
CIR is a cost to income ratio. ROA is a return on assets. INCDIV is an income diversification. HSTAT is H-statistic based on total revenue 
derived from Panzar-Rosse method. GDP is a gross domestic products growth. INF is an inflation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 a The equation: Zit = α + β1IBDUMMY + β2LN(TA)it + β3ETAit + β4NPLit + β5CIRit + β6ROAit + β7INCDIVit + β8NLTAit + β9HSTATt + β10GDPt 
+ β11INFt + β12PERIOD + εit
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would contribute positively towards the stability of 
Islamic banks. Furthermore, the results remain positive 
when the control element was applied to during crisis 
and post-crisis dummy variables. The findings of the 
proposed research are in line with previous literature, 
among others, Vallascas & Keasey (2012), Beck et al. 
(2009), Mat Rahim & Zakaria (2013), and Rajhi (2013). 
This observation is possible as non-interest based 
activities are normally exposed to a lesser amount of 
risk compared to the interest-based activities. Therefore, 
banks which generate higher income from non-interest 
activities will be less exposed to potential risks. Such 
move helps a bank to remain stable, especially during 
and post-crisis periods.
TABLE 9. Regression analysis on determinants of stability for Malaysian Islamic banksa
Estimator OLS
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
LN(TA) -7.099*** -7.348*** -7.255** -6.607** -6.723** -7.075**
(2.574) (2.727) (2.786) (3.002) (2.748) (3.003)
ETA 0.886* 0.844* 0.871* 1.040** 1.052** 0.913*
(0.469) (0.473) (0.477) (0.513) (0.497) (0.498)
NPL -0.918*** -0.896*** -0.932*** -1.088*** -1.037*** -0.978**
(0.269) (0.293) (0.306) (0.388) (0.311) (0.376)
CIR -0.439*** -0.444*** -0.444*** -0.424*** -0.420*** -0.439***
(0.107) (0.111) (0.113) (0.120) (0.115) (0.118)
ROA -1.305 -1.307 -1.375 -1.367 -1.093 -1.408
(1.067) (1.066) (1.075) (1.087) (1.093) (1.078)
INCDIV 32.24** 31.78** 32.73** 38.79** 41.60** 33.91**
(13.21) (13.39) (13.75) (17.02) (15.99) (15.60)
NLTA -0.176 -0.178 -0.184 -0.190 -0.202 -0.184
(0.141) (0.141) (0.143) (0.143) (0.145) (0.144)
HSTAT -2.625 -0.595 -2.727 14.27 -3.321
(7.054) (9.347) (9.333) (13.00) (12.42)
GDP 0.367 0.141 -1.330 0.499
(0.756) (0.785) (1.315) (0.965)
INF -0.361 -0.0256 0.427 -0.334
(1.554) (1.567) (1.625) (1.550)
Pre-crisis 5.046
(6.220)
During crisis -15.01
(9.743)
Post-crisis -1.929
(7.893)
Constant 140.7*** 146.9*** 143.2*** 126.4** 129.2** 140.5**
(44.99) (49.80) (51.34) (59.38) (52.10) (55.32)
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.336 0.337 0.339 0.344 0.352 0.339
Notes: LN(TA) is a natural log of total assets. ETA is an equity to total assets. NPL is non-performing loans. NLTA is net loans to total assets. CIR is 
a cost to income ratio. ROA is a return on assets. INCDIV is an income diversification. HSTAT is H-statistic based on total revenue derived 
from Panzar-Rosse method. GDP is gross domestic products growth. INF is inflation. 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 a The equation: Zit = α + β1LN(TA)it + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit +β4CIRit + β5ROAit + β6INCDIVit +β7NLTAit + β8HSTATt + β9GDPt +β10INFt + 
β11PERIOD + εit
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Furthermore, the coefficient of return on assets 
indicates a negative sign throughout Models 1 to 6. 
However, the result is insignificant. Similarly, the 
coefficient of net loans to total assets also indicates 
a negative sign across the models. This suggests that 
financing growth tends to affect the stability of Islamic 
banks. Nevertheless, this result is also insignificant. In 
addition, the impact of market competition on the stability 
of Islamic banks is controlled. The coefficient of HSTAT 
indicates a negative sign in Models 2 to 4, and 6. As a 
result, there is a negative impact of market competition 
on the stability of Islamic banks. However, this finding 
is also insignificant.
TABLE 10. Regression analysis on determinants of stability for Malaysian conventional banksa
Estimator OLS
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
LN(TA) -2.882** -2.869** -2.970** -3.032** -2.968** -3.035**
(1.173) (1.175) (1.209) (1.266) (1.213) (1.273)
ETA 1.267*** 1.271*** 1.251*** 1.244*** 1.250*** 1.244***
(0.341) (0.346) (0.355) (0.368) (0.357) (0.368)
NPL 0.152 0.150 0.186 0.249 0.187 0.247
(0.272) (0.271) (0.282) (0.319) (0.283) (0.339)
CIR 0.305*** 0.308*** 0.313*** 0.304*** 0.312*** 0.305***
(0.0940) (0.0978) (0.0981) (0.102) (0.0981) (0.104)
ROA 12.25*** 12.26*** 12.74*** 12.75*** 12.72*** 12.77***
(2.714) (2.710) (2.803) (2.794) (2.810) (2.798)
INCDIV 8.451* 8.397* 8.886** 9.070** 8.960** 8.970**
(4.309) (4.339) (4.342) (4.317) (4.422) (4.276)
NLTA 0.320*** 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.318*** 0.320*** 0.319***
(0.0649) (0.0656) (0.0658) (0.0653) (0.0659) (0.0654)
HSTAT 0.517 1.022 1.934 0.678 2.372
(5.432) (7.201) (7.890) (7.666) (9.133)
GDP -0.317 -0.211 -0.205 -0.359
(0.673) (0.768) (1.057) (0.689)
INF -0.389 -0.543 -0.461 -0.447
(1.354) (1.481) (1.472) (1.389)
Pre-crisis -1.146
(3.676)
During crisis 0.862
(6.142)
Post-crisis 1.129
(4.364)
Constant 22.35 21.72 24.82 26.02 24.41 25.40
(22.38) (23.03) (24.31) (25.54) (24.41) (25.00)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
R-squared 0.296 0.296 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298
Notes: LN(TA) is a natural log of total assets. ETA is an equity to total assets. NPL is non-performing loans. NLTA is net loans to total assets. CIR is 
a cost to income ratio. ROA is a return on assets. INCDIV is an income diversification. HSTAT is H-statistic based on total revenue derived 
from Panzar-Rosse method. GDP is a gross domestic products growth. INF is an inflation. 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 a The equation: Zit = α + β1LN(TA)it + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit +β4CIRit + β5ROAit + β6INCDIVit +β7NLTAit + β8HSTATt + β9GDPt +β10INFt + 
β11PERIOD + εit
128 Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 50(1)
Furthermore, during crisis and post-crisis, dummy 
variables were controlled to examine the impact of 
the recent 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis on the 
stability of Islamic banks. The signs of the coefficient 
for both sub-periods dummy variables are negative, 
whereby indicating that stability of Islamic banks is 
lower during crisis and post-crisis periods. Therefore, 
a negative impact can be observed on the stability of 
Islamic banks. Nevertheless, both results are found to 
be insignificant.
Determinants of Stability for Conventional Banks 
Next, the results of the analysis which examine the 
determinants of conventional banks are reported in 
Table 10. Firstly, it is important to highlight that the 
resulting outcome of the proposed research suggests 
that there are several determinants for the stability of 
conventional banks, which are similar to Islamic banks. 
The determinants are total assets, which indicate a 
negative relationship, equity to total assets and income 
diversification, which indicate a positive relationship.
In addition, it is observed that there are several other 
significant determinants of stability for conventional 
banks. The sign of coefficient for the cost to income 
ratio is positive and highly significant at 1 percent level 
throughout the regression models. These findings are in 
contrast to the results of Islamic banks. Therefore, an 
increase in cost to income ratio inclines to increase the 
level of stability for conventional banks. 
Furthermore, it is observed that the sign of coefficient 
for return on assets, which is the proxy for earnings and 
profitability, is positive and highly significant at 1 percent 
level throughout the regression models. These suggest a 
positive relationship between earnings and profitability 
of conventional banks and its level of stability. The 
resulting outcome of this variable supports previous 
literature, among others, Greuning & Iqbal (2008), 
Ismail (2010), Acharya (2009), Patro et al. (2013), and 
Tagkalakis (2014). Bank’s earnings and profitability help 
to increase the level of bank stability at least through 
two (2) channels. Firstly, an increase in earnings and 
profitability helps to increase shareholder and customer’s 
confidence. Secondly, an increase in earnings and 
profitability assists bank stability to increase its capital 
through retained earnings. 
Moreover, the sign of coefficient for net loans to total 
assets, which is the proxy for credit exposure, is positive 
and highly significant at 1 percent level of the regression 
models. Our findings suggest that an increase in a credit 
exposure of conventional banks inclines to increase the 
level of stability. Such scenario is possible only when 
the bank has an effective mechanism for monitoring and 
controlling of its credit exposure. The results concur the 
findings of Degryse et al. (2013), Rajhi (2013) and Gavin 
& Hausmann (1998).
In addition, the coefficients of non-performing loans 
and HSTAT also indicate positive signs for conventional 
banks across Models 1 to 6. Nevertheless, both of these 
findings are not significant. Lastly, it is observed that 
the signs of coefficients for during crisis and post-crisis 
periods dummy variables are positive. Thus, this suggests 
that the recent 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis did 
not contribute any negative impact to the stability of 
conventional banks. However, these results are found 
to be insignificant. Hence, need to be treated cautiously.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, firstly, an analysis is presented using the 
z-score and financial soundness indicators to examine 
and compare the efficiency of 17 Islamic banks and 21 
conventional banks in Malaysia over the period of 2004 
to 2013. Based on the results of regression analysis, we 
find that the large Islamic banks are less stable than the 
large conventional banks. In contrast, the results reveal 
that the small Islamic banks are found to be more stable 
than the small conventional banks.
Secondly, this paper examines the factors that 
determine the stability of the Malaysian Islamic and 
conventional banks. The regression results reveal that 
both the Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks shared 
similar determinants of stability. The first determinant is 
the total assets which indicate a negative effect on bank 
stability. The second and third determinants of stability 
of Islamic and conventional banks are the equity to 
total assets and income diversification which indicate 
a positive effect. In addition, there are two (2) other 
determinants which are specific to each type of bank. On 
one hand, for the Islamic banks, the results indicate that 
the cost to income ratio and non-performing loans have 
a negative effect on the stability of this type of bank. On 
the other hand, for the conventional banks, the results 
reveal that the cost to income ratio, return on assets and 
net loans to total assets have a positive effect on the 
stability of Malaysian conventional banks.
Based on these results, several recommendations can 
be made for bank manager and bank regulator. Firstly, 
the results suggest that being large does not necessarily 
contribute to the stability of a bank. The significant 
negative result of coefficient of total assets has proven this 
claim to be accurate in the case of Malaysian Islamic and 
conventional banks. Therefore, bank manager and bank 
regulator should take extra precaution when planning to 
increase bank size.
Secondly, it is recommended that both the Islamic and 
conventional banks increase their level of capitalisation. 
This is because the result of coefficient of the equity to 
total assets indicates a positive relationship with bank 
stability. Furthermore, it is also recommended that both 
types of banks to increase the amount of their non-interest 
income. This is because the particular variable tends to 
indicate a positive effect on the stability of these banks. 
Therefore, it is recommended that bank manager focuses 
on diversifying the source of income in the future.
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Our findings are important for several reasons. 
Firstly, although numerous studies are found to compare 
the stability of Islamic and conventional banks, to the best 
of our knowledge, these studies have not given specific 
concern to the stability of the Malaysian banking sector. 
The study of Mat Rahim & Zakaria (2013) used z-score 
and non-performing loans as an indicator of stability, 
whereas Verbeet (2014) used a limited sample of banks 
to compare the stability of Islamic and conventional 
banks in Malaysia. Therefore, our study is important as 
we enriched the literature by including new indicators of 
stability while considering a bigger sample size.
Furthermore, Malaysia is one of the pioneer countries 
that has successfully implemented Islamic banking 
system in a dual banking system. This encourages other 
countries to follow the model of Malaysian Islamic 
banking sector. As Malaysian Islamic banking model 
is being referred to by many countries, understanding 
the current state of stability of the Malaysian Islamic 
banks in comparison to the stability of its conventional 
counterparts is vital as it is essential to the policy maker 
of those countries. Thus, our study investigates this issue 
which at the same time being our second contribution to 
the literature.
Lastly, our study is important as we examine the 
factors that determine the stability of Malaysian Islamic 
and conventional banks surrounding the global financial 
crisis. In addition, we include the pre, during and post 
crisis dummy variables in order to examine the impact of 
the global financial crisis on the stability of the Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks. Existing literature 
that examines the level of stability in the Malaysian 
Islamic banking sector does not lay any emphasis on the 
impact of the recent 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis 
especially during the post-crisis period. Hence, our study 
is important as we also add to the literature by examining 
the impact of the recent 2007 GFC on the stability of the 
Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks.
This research has one (1) major limitation which 
involves employing a market-based indicator to 
measure bank stability. This limitation is due to the data 
requirement of a market-based indicator which requires 
a bank to be publicly listed, whereby, in this case, 
the majority of the Islamic banks in Malaysia are not 
publicly listed. Thus, the market-based indicator could 
not be employed to measure bank stability in this study 
due to the availability of market-based data for Islamic 
banks. Therefore, it is proposed that future research on 
the stability of Islamic banks to explore the applicability 
of other available methods to measure the stability of 
Islamic banks. The application of various indicators could 
explain how these indicators are related to one another.
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